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PRESIDENT MADISON’S LIVING 
CONSTITUTION:  FIXATION, LIQUIDATION, AND 




Originalism is experiencing a classic paradigm crisis.1  In an attempt to 
stave off a host of challenges, originalists have adapted and amended their 
theory so many times in recent years that it now seems more like a failed 
Rube Goldberg mousetrap than a viable constitutional theory.2  Although 
some originalists see this process as a sign of the doctrine’s vitality, a more 
plausible account would recognize that the theory has collapsed under the 
weight of its many contradictions.3  One of the many ironies associated with 
originalism’s intellectual failure is that its assumptions about language and 
constitutional meaning are closer in spirit to the anti-Federalists who were 
defeated in 1788 than the victorious Federalists who actually framed, ratified, 
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and dominated politics and the federal courts in the decades after the adoption 
of the Constitution.4  Thus, public meaning originalism, the theory that 
continues to shape the modern terms of debate, particularly among 
conservatives, is a loser’s theory.5  This irony has thus far eluded leading 
champions of public meaning originalism, who have remained resolutely 
uninterested in engaging seriously with historical criticism of their theory.6  
Two of the central tenets of public meaning originalism—the fixation thesis 
and the constraint thesis—share little with Federalist constitutionalism and 
are in fact much closer in spirit to anti-Federalist constitutional ideas.7  This 
irony comes into clear focus if one looks at an important but generally 
underappreciated moment in early constitutional history:  President James 
Madison’s repudiation of his earlier opposition to the Bank of the United 
States.8  In this debate, President Madison embraced a theory far closer to 
living constitutionalism than to originalism.9 
 
 4. For a critique of originalism focused on its failure to grapple with founding-era 
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 7. On fixation and constraint, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist 
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HUMANS. 295 (2011). 
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I.  MR. MADISON’S MESS:  THE WAR OF 1812, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, 
AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL CHANGE 
After nearly a decade in opposition during the 1790s, Republicans 
celebrated their presidential triumph in the election of 1800 with toasts and 
songs about “Jefferson and Liberty.”10  Federalists feared that the new 
president was a disciple of Thomas Paine’s radical democratic ideas.11  A 
Jeffersonian presidency, they dreaded, would be a political catastrophe that 
would undo all their work of the previous decade.  President Thomas 
Jefferson turned out to be a very different person from Vice President 
Jefferson, the leader of the Republican opposition during the John Adams 
administration.  Rather than mount a full-scale attack on Federalist policy, 
Jefferson adopted a less confrontational approach.  In his presidential 
inaugural address, he struck a conciliatory tone and reminded Americans:  
“We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists.”12 
Jefferson also promised the nation “a wise and frugal government.”13  
Implementing this, however, proved far more difficult than he had hoped.  
The opportunity to purchase the Louisiana Territory and double the size of 
the new nation led him to cast aside his constitutional theory of strict 
construction to achieve his political goal of creating an expanding yeoman 
republic.14  By the end of Jefferson’s second term in 1809, some Americans 
believed that the president and his Republican allies had become 
indistinguishable from their Federalist opponents when it came to using 
federal power to further their goals.15  The same would prove true for 
Jefferson’s anointed successor, James Madison, who made additional 
compromises that left some of his most ardent supporters feeling betrayed.16 
Events in Europe posed several challenges to Jefferson and Madison that 
neither figure could have anticipated when they led the opposition during the 
tempestuous 1790s.  In 1803, two weeks after selling Louisiana, France again 
found itself at war with Great Britain.17  Although Napoleon’s armies 
dominated the European continent, Britain’s navy commanded the seas and 
defeated the French fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.  American 
 
 10. GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC:  DEMOCRACY, 
EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S (2019). 
 11. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:  JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 50, 
105 (2005); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY:  A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1789–1815, at 177–78, 199–200 (2009). 
 12. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:  
WRITINGS 492, 493 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).  See also generally JAMES ROGER SHARP, 
THE DEADLOCKED ELECTION OF 1800:  JEFFERSON, BURR, AND THE UNION IN THE BALANCE 
(2010); WILENTZ, supra note 11; WOOD, supra note 11. 
 13. Jeffry H. Morrison, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson:  A “Friendship Which Was 
for Life,” in A COMPANION TO JAMES MADISON AND JAMES MONROE 259, 269 (Stuart Leibiger 
ed., 2013). 
 14. JEREMY D. BAILEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND EXECUTIVE POWER 2, 4–5 (2007). 
 15. Id. at 2. 
 16. For a sympathetic account of Jefferson’s effort to adapt his political ideals to the 
presidency, see id. 
 17. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 124. 
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merchants reaped huge profits from trade with both the French and the British 
in the nascent stages of the European conflict.18  Accordingly, the United 
States insisted that neutral nations had a right to carry on nonmilitary trade 
with both sides in the conflict, but neither Britain nor France honored this 
idea.  The British navy boarded and searched American ships and seized 
cargoes without providing compensation.  Even more galling to Americans 
was the British practice of impressment—forcing merchant seamen to serve 
in the British navy.  Many American sailors had once served in the British 
navy but now claimed American citizenship.19  Great Britain refused to 
recognize these claims, arguing that the men were deserters still subject to 
British law.  Between 1803 and 1812, the British navy abducted and 
impressed 6000 Americans.20 
Hoping to avoid war with Britain and France, Jefferson proposed a policy 
of “peaceable coercion.”21  The 1807 Embargo Act22 became the cornerstone 
of this policy.  By keeping America’s ships out of harm’s way and depriving 
Britain and France of the economic benefits of American trade, Jeffersonian 
policy was designed to force both nations to respect the right of neutral 
nations to trade on the high seas.23  The policy was a total failure.  Smugglers 
flouted the ban, and it proved exceedingly unpopular in New England and 
seaport towns.24  American exports fell from $108 million in 1807 to $22 
million in 1808.25  To enforce the embargo along the Canadian border, 
Jefferson had to send in troops, a decision he had decried during the Whiskey 
Rebellion a decade earlier.26 
Federalists in New England, whose political fortunes had been flagging, 
now regained their voices, rallying against Jefferson and his “Dambargo.”27  
Jefferson’s Embargo Act not only divided Republicans but also strengthened 
the fortunes of the Federalists in many places, particularly New England, 
where the economic impact of the embargo struck hardest.28  The Federalist 
presidential candidate in the 1808 election, Charles Pinckney, received three 
times as many votes as he had in 1804, doing particularly well in New 
England.29  Despite this strong showing, especially in New England and New 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451. 
 23. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 124. 
 24. Id. at 124–25. 
 25. Id. at 124. 
 26. Id. at 125.  See generally J. C. A. STAGG, THE WAR OF 1812:  CONFLICT FOR A 
CONTINENT (2012). 
 27. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 125. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Philip J. Lampi, The Federalist Party Resurgence, 1808–1816:  Evidence from the 
New Nation Votes Database, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 255, 259 (2013). 
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York, Madison defeated Pinckney by 122 to 47 electoral votes to become the 
fourth president of the United States in 1809.30 
Unfortunately for Madison, he had inherited a major foreign policy crisis 
from Jefferson.  The embargo had not forced Britain and France to change 
their policies.  Southern agriculture and New England commerce had 
suffered and frustration among Madison’s supporters was growing.31  As 
prospects for avoiding armed conflict dwindled, many Republicans were 
swept up by a more belligerent attitude:  many believed that war was the only 
option left.32  Support for this stance was far from universal among 
Republicans.  Militarism revived old fears and rhetoric, especially among the 
“Old Republicans,” who believed that war would precipitate the 
establishment of a large military, new taxes, and an increased concentration 
of power in the federal government.33 
Changes in the structure of politics played a major role in the emergence 
of a pro-war strain of Republicanism.  The political center of gravity of 
Jeffersonian Republicanism had shifted from old colonial centers of power, 
such as Virginia to the southwest, to new states like Kentucky and Tennessee.  
Congressmen Henry Clay of Kentucky and John C. Calhoun, an up-country 
South Carolinian, were the rising stars who spoke for a new breed of 
Republican politician.34 
In addition to championing a military response to Great Britain’s actions 
on the high seas, many Americans viewed the struggle as a way to settle old 
scores, including recent Irish immigrants, who had felt the oppressive hand 
of British rule firsthand, and frontier settlers who were angered by British 
trade with Native Americans, a lucrative commerce that included guns.35  
Although the immediate cause of the War of 1812 was British naval policy, 
the war had the greatest transformative impact along the western frontier.  
For Republican “War Hawks,” expansion into Native American territory, the 
annexation of Canada, and possible expansion into Florida were driven by a 
nearly insatiable desire for new lands for expropriation and settlement.36 
Unfortunately, America was ill prepared to take on the greatest naval 
power in the world.  Great Britain had created a powerful fiscal-military state 
that was far better equipped to wage war.37  By contrast, America’s military 
was greatly weakened by Republican demilitarization begun by Jefferson.  
 
 30. Aaron N. Coleman, President James Madison’s Domestic Policies, 1809–1817:  
Jeffersonian Factionalism and the Beginnings of American Nationalism, in A COMPANION TO 
JAMES MADISON AND JAMES MONROE, supra note 13, at 192, 195. 
 31. See Jasper M. Trautsch, “Mr. Madison’s War” or the Dynamic of Early American 
Nationalism?, 10 EARLY AM. STUD. 630, 645–46 (2012). 
 32. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 129. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 129–30.  See also generally J. C. A. STAGG, MR. MADISON’S WAR:  POLITICS, 
DIPLOMACY, AND WARFARE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1783–1830 (1983). 
 35. See ALAN TAYLOR, THE CIVIL WAR OF 1812:  AMERICAN CITIZENS, BRITISH SUBJECTS, 
IRISH REBELS & INDIAN ALLIES 6–9 (2011). 
 36. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 130. 
 37. See generally JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER:  WAR, MONEY, AND THE ENGLISH 
STATE, 1688–1783 (1990). 
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Even so, led by Clay and Calhoun, the War Hawks agitated for war.  Madison 
too finally accepted that Jefferson’s alternative policy of commercial 
coercion had failed and war was almost inevitable.38  However, the strong 
opposition of the Anglophilic Federalists and the reluctance of some old-
school Republicans to sanction the expansion in federal power necessary to 
wage war delayed a declaration until June 1812, when Congress voted for 
war 79 to 49 in the House of Representatives and 19 to 13 in the Senate.39  
No one factor explains the voting pattern, but by 1812, many Americans had 
come to believe that the war was a second chapter in America’s struggle for 
independence, a conflict that was absolutely necessary to bring Britain to 
heel, break British domination of international trade, and cut off British 
support for hostile Native American populations along the frontier.40 
In New England, popular resistance to Republican power bubbled up from 
below, even as elites formulated a more formal set of responses to a 
potentially disastrous war.41  Across Massachusetts, state legislatures 
received petitions from towns requesting that their state government 
“interpose,” effectively creating a shield that could protect the liberties of 
citizens from the tyranny of the central government.  The current threat now 
came from Republicans, not from Federalists.42  These “memorials” 
requested a convention of the “northern and commercial states” to address 
the constitutional issues raised by Republican policy.43  Though a number of 
these issues had been percolating for a decade, after two years of war, there 
was talk of more radical steps, such as secession or direct diplomatic 
engagement with the British.44 
In response to the petitions, Massachusetts’s legislature and its governor 
threw their weight behind a New England states’ convention that would 
convene in Hartford, Connecticut.45  However, not all states sent full 
delegations, and the Federalists who did travel to Hartford were dominated 
by moderate voices, not the firebrands of secession.46  Rather than follow a 
 
 38. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 130; see also TAYLOR, supra note 35. 
 39. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 130. 
 40. Id.; see also David J. Siemers, President James Madison and Foreign Affairs, 1809–
1817:  Years of Principle and Peril, in A COMPANION TO JAMES MADISON AND JAMES MONROE, 
supra note 13, at 208, 216. 
 41. See generally Joshua M. Smith, Murder on Isle Au Haut:  Violence and Jefferson’s 
Embargo in Coastal Maine, 1807–1809, ME. HIST., Spring 2000, at 17. 
 42. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 132. 
 43. Id. (quoting Letter from Joseph Lyman to Several Gentlemen (Jan. 5, 1814), in NOAH 
WEBSTER, A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON POLITICAL, LITERARY, AND MORAL SUBJECTS 312, 314 
(New York, Webster & Clark 1843)); see also Thomas Jefferson, A Proclamation (Apr. 19, 
1808), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 438, 439 (New 
York, Bureau of Nat’l Literature 1897); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Daniel D. Tompkins 
(Aug. 15, 1808), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 131, 132 (Albert Ellery Bergh 
ed., 1907). 
 44. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 132.  For the standard account, see JAMES M. 
BANNER, TO THE HARTFORD CONVENTION:  THE FEDERALISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF PARTY 
POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1789–1815 (1970). 
 45. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 132. 
 46. Id. 
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radical states’ rights agenda, the Hartford Convention adopted a platform of 
more moderate constitutional reforms, including seven proposed 
amendments that squarely targeted Republican power.47 
The first proposal aimed to weaken Southern influence in Congress by 
revoking the three-fifths compromise, a change that would cut back 
Republican power by depriving them of a significant portion of their southern 
electoral base.48  The second proposed amendment attacked the Louisiana 
Purchase and its support for the spread of slavery.  Rather than a simple 
majority, to admit new states, future acquisitions of land would require a 
supermajority.49  The Federalists sought to constitutionalize their criticism of 
the embargo, requiring any future embargo lasting longer than sixty days to 
attain a similar supermajority.50  Moreover, in a not very subtle rebuke of 
Albert Gallatin, a leading Jeffersonian, the Hartford Convention proposed 
that naturalized immigrants no longer be permitted to hold civil office or 
serve in Congress.51  Presidents would be limited to a single term.  Finally, a 
proposal aimed to prevent a future “Virginia dynasty” from dominating the 
presidency would prohibit presidents from the same state following one 
another consecutively.52 
This list of proposals was transmitted to the states so they could commence 
the formal amendment process.53  Initially, the timing seemed propitious, 
coming at the end of a dispiriting, two-year military stalemate that included 
the burning of the president’s residence (a humiliation that also included 
British troops’ ransacking the mansion and feasting on an elegant dinner that 
had been prepared for President Madison and his wife, Dolly).54  Federalists 
might have had good reason to think America would be receptive to the 
Hartford Convention’s statements of grievances and reforms when they were 
formulated.55  However, by the time the proposals were published, a peace 
treaty ending the war had been signed in Ghent, Belgium.56  Even more 
disastrous for the hopes of a Federalist revival, though, was the news of a 
stunning victory by Andrew Jackson and his troops at the Battle of New 
Orleans on January 8, 1815.57  Although the Treaty of Ghent had already 
been signed, Jackson’s impressive victory over the British was a cause for 
national celebration.58  Indeed, Jackson would ride “The Glorious 8th of 
January” to a political career that symbolized, if it did not embody, the 
triumph of a racialized vision of democratic constitutionalism over the 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.; see also Alison L. LaCroix, A Singular and Awkward War:  The Transatlantic 
Context of the Hartford Convention, 6 AM. NINETEENTH CENTURY HIST. 3, 22 (2005). 
 49. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 132. 
 50. Id. at 132–33. 
 51. Id. at 133. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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Federalists’ hierarchical, but in some respects more inclusive, form of 
constitutionalism.59  The vision of the Hartford Convention and the New 
England Federalists were dashed, at least as a force in national politics.60 
The War of 1812 forced a major realignment in American politics.  The 
war marked the end of Federalist hope for political revival at the national 
level.  Federalists, particularly in New England, suffered significant setbacks 
because of their anti-war stance and anti-nationalism.  Still, there were some 
notable local successes by Federalists that revealed the remarkable resiliency 
of their ideology in many parts of the nation.  Federalist newspaper editors 
and local politicians continued to challenge the Madison administration, 
despite the weakness of their party’s efforts on the national scene.61 
Even more troubling to Madison’s agenda was the fracturing of his 
Republican coalition.  The Old Republican animus toward Madison 
persisted, but the War of 1812 spurred younger Republicans to drift in a neo-
Federalist direction, especially on matters of political economy and military 
policy.62  Rejecting Alexander Hamilton’s vision of a powerful fiscal 
military state modeled on Great Britain was one thing, but the War Hawks 
recognized that it was vital to create a Republican alternative.63  Traditional 
Republican hostility to institutions like a standing army, a national bank, and 
a national system of internal improvements had hampered the war effort and 
left the nation vulnerable.  Dogmatic adherence to strict construction and 
skepticism of federal power gave way to a more pragmatic view of the 
Constitution for politicians such as Clay and Calhoun.64 
Although at first glance it might seem that the pressures of war led 
Federalists and Republicans to reverse roles on questions of federal power, 
this claim obscures far more than it illuminates.  The postures Republicans 
and Federalists adopted in response to the challenges of the War of 1812 were 
predictable given the structures created by the federal system.65  The defenses 
of states’ rights were never exclusively the province of Republicans any more 
than defenses of federal power were the exclusive preserve of Federalists.66  
In 1788, the most nationalist-minded Federalists were forced to adapt their 
arguments to anti-Federalist critiques, acknowledging a limited commitment 
to states’ rights, at least within the sphere of powers clearly reserved to the 
states by the Constitution.67  Madison was no exception to this process of 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Lampi, supra note 29, at 275. 
 61. See generally Andrew W. Robertson, Afterword, Reconceptualizing Jeffersonian 
Democracy, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 317 (2013). 
 62. See LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 129–33. 
 63. Id. 
 64. For an important collection of essays reevaluating the Jeffersonian period, see 
JEFFERSONIANS IN POWER:  THE RHETORIC OF OPPOSITION MEETS THE REALITIES OF 
GOVERNING (Joanne B. Freeman & Johann N. Neem eds., 2019). 
 65. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 134. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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accommodation and adaptation.68  One of the most dramatic examples of 
how Madison’s thought evolved during the debate over ratification may be 
found in his engagement with anti-Federalist critiques of consolidation and 
the structural safeguards created by the Constitution to limit potential federal 
tyranny.  Federalist No. 46 contemplated the unthinkable:  a nightmare 
scenario in which the individual states might need to call on their militias to 
protect themselves from federal overreach.69  It is unlikely Madison would 
have felt compelled to lay out this doomsday option at the outset of 
ratification were it not for persistent anti-Federalist attacks.  To fend off the 
exaggerated rhetoric and attacks of anti-Federalists, Madison was led to offer 
concrete assurances that the new federal government would never bring 
about the dreaded “consolidation” that so many anti-Federalists warned was 
inevitable.70 
Madison’s frank recognition of the reality that the state militias might 
serve as the ultimate check on federal power, something that is difficult to 
comprehend in our modern post–Civil War vision of federalism, is a useful 
reminder of the historical chasm that separates modern constitutional law 
from the founding era.71 
Making sense of Madison’s evolving constitutional thought has posed a 
host of interpretive problems for scholars.72  In comparison to Hamilton’s 
radical nationalist and statist notions, Madison’s federalism was 
conceptualized in dynamic, not static terms.73  Achieving the correct balance 
between the centripetal and centrifugal forces in American politics at any 
particular moment in time required adjustments and accommodations of the 
facts on the ground as well as the actions of multiple constitutional actors.74  
More importantly, throughout his public life, Madison wrestled with the 
more fundamental question:  how to preserve his constitutional ideals in the 
face of the crises and challenges posed by changing circumstances.  Modern 
scholars have spilled a good deal of ink debating the so-called “Madison 
Problem”—the degree to which Madison’s constitutional ideas and 
commitments shifted over time.75  One possible solution to this conundrum 
 
 68. See generally SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS:  ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE 
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 69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott, Foresman 
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 70. Id. 
 71. See Gienapp, supra note 6, at 942–43. 
 72. See generally Alan Gibson, The Madisonian Madison and the Question of 
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David S. Schwartz & John Mikhail, The Other Madison Problem, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033, 
2046 (2021). 
 73. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 134. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND:  REVISING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015); GREG WEINER, MADISON’S METRONOME:  THE 
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is to recognize that Madison had always accepted that the realities of 
constitutional politics would often force periodic reconsiderations of his 
constitutional theory.  In short, Madison’s vision of constitutional laws was 
always attuned to the necessity of change in response to new challenges.  In 
modern constitutional law, it is common to think of law limiting and framing 
politics.  In the founding era, the reverse was true.  Politics set the parameters 
of constitutional change.76 
The War of 1812 tested Madison’s constitutional views and commitments 
on many issues that had divided Americans since 1788.  The problem of 
wartime finance forced him to revisit his earlier opposition to Hamilton’s 
bank.  The first bank debate pit Hamilton against Jefferson and Madison.77  
Much had changed in the years since that conflict divided Americans, but the 
antibank rhetoric of the 1790s was a powerful language readily available to 
those who wished to oppose it.78  Although many of the same ideological 
issues were put in play, the dynamics of constitutional politics were radically 
different during Madison’s presidency.79  Since its incorporation, the bank 
had blossomed and largely escaped political controversy.80  Once viewed as 
an institution closely aligned with eastern financial interests and a source of 
the corruption inimical to the survival of republican government, the bank 
now enjoyed broader support.  It had developed ties with economic interests 
in multiple regions of the nation, including links to the south and west.81  The 
bank was no longer seen as a creature of a small regional cabal of economic 
elites but rather, it could claim to be central to multiple sectors of the growing 
American economy.82  To further diffuse criticism that the bank would 
become an agent of consolidation and undermine the states, the individual 
branches enjoyed a good deal of autonomy.  Rather than pursuing a 
monolithic set of fiscal goals driven by a distant national elite, the bank was 
able to forge stronger ties with regional and local economic elites whose own 
economic fortunes were now tied to the prosperity of an institution they once 
viewed with suspicion.83 
Considering its importance to the American economy, rechartering the 
bank should have been an uncomplicated affair.84  But despite its newfound 
support, the ghost of Hamilton continued to hover over the debate, making it 
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an easy target for Old Republicans who believed that the dangers of the bank 
were not offset by its economic benefits.85  Moreover, nothing in the ensuing 
years had changed the view of many that the power to create such an 
institution was simply not among those delegated to the federal government 
by the Constitution.86  Finally, some simply attacked the bank for reasons of 
political advantage.87 
II.  MADISONIAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND “JUST CONSTRUCTION”:  
AN INFERENTIALIST MODEL 
Beginning with his earliest writings, Madison proved to be a pragmatic 
and adaptable constitutional theorist.  Over the course of ratification and after 
his election to Congress, he was forced to address a variety of novel 
constitutional questions.  The touchstones of his theory were not fixation and 
constraint, the twin poles of much modern originalism but rather, flexibility 
and change. 
When the issue of the president’s removal power was debated shortly after 
ratification, members of the First Congress were deeply divided over how to 
interpret the text of the Constitution.  Representative Elbridge Gerry 
articulated a distinctly anti-Federalist point of view, arguing that “all 
construction of the meaning of the constitution is dangerous or unnatural, and 
therefore ought to be avoided.”88  Madison and several others rejected 
Gerry’s strong textualism in favor of an argument that rested on the “nature 
of things.”89  Unfortunately, there was considerable disagreement over what 
the nature of things was in this instance.  Different interpretive theories and 
different textual sources were pressed into battle by the participants in the 
debate.  Some invoked the intent of the Philadelphia Convention, but others, 
most notably Madison, referenced the intentions of the state ratification 
conventions, and some appealed to the criticism of anti-Federalist essayists 
or the exegesis of the executive in arguments developed in the various essays 
of The Federalist.90 
During the debate over the Bank of the United States, Gerry and Madison 
found themselves opposing one another again.  This debate offered more 
opportunities to flesh out issues of constitutional interpretation.  The 
language of the Constitution, Gerry argued, had to be interpreted using the 
traditional tools of statutory construction, and he turned to William 
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Blackstone as the recognized authority for discerning those rules.91  Madison 
rejected Gerry’s analysis, noting that the U.S. Constitution was a different 
type of legal instrument that demanded a novel approach.  Madison argued 
that the intentions of the state ratification conventions, not the Framers, were 
dispositive of the Constitution’s legal meaning.92  The disagreement between 
Madison and Gerry underscored a point that had become obvious during the 
debate over the removal power:  there was no universally accepted method 
of interpreting the new Constitution.93  Indeed, there was no consensus on 
what sort of legal document the Constitution was or which modes of legal 
analysis were best suited to glean its meaning.94 
Some modern originalists have chosen to use modern philosophy of 
language and analogize constitutional interpretation in the founding era to an 
ordinary conversation between social equals engaged in an open and direct 
exchange of information in the contemporary Anglo-American academic 
world.95  The “standard communication model” favored by many originalists 
rests on a set of anachronistic assumptions about founding-era constitutional 
debate.  Conversations about constitutional meaning, from the plebeian 
world of the tavern to the more formal discourse evident in courts of law, 
were typically shaped by strategic and political concerns, not the ordinary 
maxims of conversation that modern philosophers of language treat as 
universal norms evidenced in all cultures at all times.96  Most forms of 
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constitutional communication in the founding era were shaped by the 
rhetorical and ideological rules of eighteenth-century Anglo-American 
debate, not the ordinary conversation rules that modern philosophers have 
taken as normative in simple, direct communication.97  Indeed, if one studies 
actual patterns of reading to make sense of the way the Constitution was 
interpreted in 1788—focusing on real eighteenth-century constitutional 
communication, not some fictional version conjured up by modern 
originalists—it is clear that founding-era readers were far more sophisticated 
in decoding texts and were especially mindful of political agendas and 
rhetorical excesses.  Communication was not always honest, seldom concise, 
hardly ever maximally informative, and rarely clear.  To deal with these 
realities, founding-era readers approached constitutional writings with a 
good deal of suspicion and filtered them through an ideological lens that 
reflected the political fears, aspirations, and experiences of different readers 
and actors.  Thus, when compared to founding-era Americans, modern 
originalist modes of reading seem extremely simplistic and naïve.98 
One of the many ironies unnoticed by modern originalists arises from 
Madison’s theory of ratifier intent.  According to the standard philosophy-
of-language communication model, in ordinary conversation, speakers’ 
meaning is typically dispositive.99  Yet, Madison’s theory of ratifier intent 
focuses not on speakers’ meaning but on a very specific group of listeners—
the participants in state ratification conventions.100  This simple fact alone 
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renders the comparison to ordinary face-to-face acts of communication 
dubious.  Similarly, attempting to analogize interpreting the Constitution to 
activities such as reading recipes or grocery lists is just silly.101  We do not 
typically turn over our recipe or grocery list in a supermarket and ask a group 
of strangers what they think a recipe list containing the term “nice cut of stew 
meat” ought to mean.102  Indeed, one might find very different answers if this 
question is asked in a kosher butcher shop versus an Italian one. 
Indeed, the irony of comparing constitutional communication to a recipe 
is compounded if one is familiar with the vast corpus of founding-era 
writings produced during ratification.  The idea of treating such texts like 
recipes was used as a joke by Federalists to mock anti-Federalists.103  
Obviously, modern originalists have not gotten the punch line of that joke.  
Humor, of course, has always been a serious matter, as any comedian or 
linguistic anthropologist could tell you.104  To understand a joke, one must 
attain a level of fluency in a language, something few originalists have 
managed.  Sadly, most originalists still do not get the joke.105 
It is also important to recognize that Madison’s early attempt to formulate 
a coherent theory of constitutional interpretation in the 1790s was provisional 
at best, a preliminary effort that was subject to revision.  Indeed, it is worth 
recalling that no theory of constitutional interpretation advanced by anyone 
in the founding era, including Madison’s, was ever officially sanctioned.106  
Although the Constitution was ratified by a legal process, the legal methods 
used to interpret it were contested throughout this period and no consensus 
ever emerged.  None of the methods, including Madison’s, has the force of 
law.107  Madison’s theory represented his best attempt at a particular 
constitutional moment to articulate one plausible model of constitutional 
interpretation that was consistent with his larger commitment to his theory of 
popular sovereignty.108  Although some modern interpreters may find 
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Madison’s theory normatively appealing, it is not hardwired into our 
constitutional jurisprudence any more than the rival theories that Elbridge 
Gerry or others proffered in the First Congress.  Indeed, none of the theories 
floated by different actors during the founding period can claim any special 
status in this regard.109 
Finally, making sense of Madison’s evolving ideas about the problem of 
constitutional meaning requires grappling with his views of the 
indeterminacies of language and his recognition that politics would 
invariably trump legal interpretation in almost every instance.110  Mere 
parchment barriers, even when buttressed with a theory of constitutional 
interpretation, would never be a match for the will of the people or the 
machinations of the politically powerful organized as a faction.111  This 
recognition did not lead Madison to despair, but it should temper modern 
efforts to elevate Madison’s theory above contemporary rivals.  For Madison 
and many others within the founding generation, it was politics all the way 
down. 
Madison had little faith in recourse to abstract arguments about the 
Constitution’s text as a method to resolve controversial legal issues.  Instead, 
constitutional meaning would be worked on a case-by-case basis, by actors 
engaged in constitutional politics.112  Madison called this process 
constitutional “liquidation.”113  In a letter to Virginia jurist Spencer Roane, 
Madison observed that it “was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that 
difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in 
expounding terms & phrases necessarily used in such a Charter,” particularly, 
the language of federalism that “divide[d] legislation between the General 
and the local Governments.”114  Accordingly, “it might require a regular 
course of practice to liquidate” the language.115  The issue of the bank’s 
constitutionality offered the clearest example of “liquidation.”116  Nearly two 
decades of politics and practice had transformed the bank’s role in American 
life.  Agents of the federal government had done official business with the 
bank, implying a kind of tacit constitutional recognition.117  The bank had 
also gained a measure of popular approval, evidenced in its growth and 
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prosperity. Moreover, the failure of efforts to defund or abolish it only 
underscored its broad acceptance.118 
Lastly, the bank, as a party to a number of proceedings, had been 
recognized by the courts.119  All three branches of government, and the 
people themselves, had by their actions conferred legitimacy on the bank, 
which was now an accomplished legal fact.  Madison accounted for all these 
factors in 1811 as he devised his position on the constitutional legitimacy of 
the bank.120  Constitutional meaning had emerged from the dynamic world 
of constitutional politics.121 
Nonetheless, Madison’s position over the bank recharter shocked many 
Republicans who deemed it a betrayal of strict construction and a repudiation 
of states’ rights principles:  two of the core beliefs that had undergirded their 
opposition to the Federalists since the 1790s.122  One of the most vociferous 
critics in the press, writing under the pen name “Tammany,” derided 
Madison’s theory of the Constitution as “chameleon-like.”123  Tammany 
wondered if the Constitution’s meaning “changes its hue according to the 
times and positions in which it may viewed.”124 
Madison concluded that his answer was yes.  This was the opposite view 
of Old Republicans, who clung to an anti-Federalist conception of 
constitutionalism.  Writing for the Richmond Enquirer, Harmodius 
“challenged the idea that the Constitution might evolve by means of judicial 
precedents.”125  In other words, Old Republicans saw Madison’s theory of 
liquidation as constitutional heresy.  Rather than conform to the “changing 
and uncertain light of precedent,” elected officials, including judges, 
representatives, and even presidents, ought to be bound by the unchanging 
“words and spirit of the Constitution.”126  For Tammany and Harmodius, the 
meaning of the Constitution’s text had been fixed at the time of enactment 
and ought to constrain subsequent interpreters.127  Ironically, modern 
originalists are the heirs of Tammany and Harmodius, not Madison. 
Originalists’ commitment to the ideas of fixation and constraint are closer in 
spirit to the Old Republican critics and their anti-Federalist views of 
constitutional interpretation than they are to the ideas championed by 
Madison or the Marshall Court.128 
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Madison had never had much faith that language, particularly 
constitutional texts, could ever effectively fix meaning.129  He made his 
concerns explicit in Federalist No. 37: 
[T]he medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each 
other adds a fresh embarrassment.  The use of words is to express ideas.  
Perspicuity therefore requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly 
formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctively and 
exclusively appropriated to them.  But no language is so copious as to 
supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to 
include many, equivocally denoting different ideas.  Hence it must happen, 
that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and 
however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of 
them may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of the terms in which 
it is delivered.  And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, 
according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined.  When the 
Almighty Himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, 
His meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by the 
cloudy medium through which it is communicated.130 
Madison’s pessimistic view of the limits of language was not shared by 
many anti-Federalists, particularly those who viewed written texts through a 
lens provided by popular Bible-based modes of reading, which were strongly 
textualist.131  Rather than approach language from the perspective of John 
Locke or enlightenment theory, these popular radicals were far more likely 
to approach language from a set of assumptions about meaning derived from 
the more egalitarian strains of evangelical Protestantism.132  At its most 
extreme, anti-Federalism inclined toward a form of constitutional literalism, 
demanding that legal texts be written clearly in simple, precise language.133 
Originalists are fond of quoting Madison’s letter to Henry Lee to support 
their claim that Madison was a modern-style originalist when it came to 
interpreting the Constitution.  It is worth taking a closer look at Madison’s 
argument in that letter.  After disparaging the baneful influence of party on 
American politics and constitutional debate, Madison wrote: 
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the 
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation.  In that sense alone it 
is the legitimate Constitution.  And if that be not the guide in expounding 
it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable, more than for a 
faithful exercise of its powers.  If the meaning of the text be sought in the 
changeable meaning of the words composing it, it is evident that the shape 
and attributes of the Government must partake of the changes to which the 
words and phrases of all living languages are constantly subject.  What a 
metamorphosis would be produced in the code of law if all its ancient 
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phraseology were to be taken in its modern sense.  And that the language 
of our Constitution is already undergoing interpretations unknown to its 
founders, will I believe appear to all unbiassed Enquirers into the history 
of its origin and adoption.134 
The first point worth noting is that Madison’s description of prevailing 
practice underscores that a dynamic view of constitutional interpretation had 
already taken hold of American constitutional law. Madison was on the 
losing side of this battle, so it is unclear what his prescriptions means for 
modern legal interpretation.135 
Secondly, the text that preceded this passage so beloved by public meaning 
originalists suggests a very different understanding of Madison’s views of 
constitutional interpretation.  Madison was not defending a strong textualist 
approach but rather endorsing an approach to constitutional interpretation 
that was more holistic.  The Constitution, he wrote, ought to be given “that 
just construction, which with the aid of time and habit, may put an end to the 
more dangerous schisms otherwise growing out of it.”136 
Arriving at a just construction of the Constitution had proven to be 
anything but simple or straightforward in Madison’s experience.137  The 
liquidation of meaning that Madison envisioned was never intended to be a 
strongly textualist mode of analysis divorced from the realities of 
constitutional politics.  Although the meaning of the words may not have 
changed, a just construction of them would shift in response to changes in 
constitutional politics.  Construction, in Madison’s view, provided the 
flexible tools necessary to adapt the Constitution to changing times.138 
Madison’s view of construction should not be confused with the way 
modern originalists use this term.139  Some modern originalists have argued 
that the terms “interpretation” and “construction” ought to be used in a highly 
technical and totally anachronistic sense, at odds with founding-era usage.  
This seems an odd choice for those claiming to seek the original meaning of 
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the text.  The most vociferous champion of this ahistorical framework is 
originalist Lawrence Solum.140  According to Solum, “interpretation” is the 
process of establishing the “enriched” linguistic meaning of a legal text.  
“Construction,” in his view, is a separate task that ascertains the legal effect 
or legal meaning of a text.141  Solum’s model imposes a set of modern 
jurisprudential categories on founding-era texts that would have made little 
sense to Madison and others.  Apart from a few cases, such as the language 
describing the age requirements for holding office, there were few parts of 
the Constitution’s text that could be understood without engaging in a 
process of just or rational construction.  Solum’s model erroneously assumes 
that the relevant background assumptions and interpretive rules needed to 
make sense of the Constitution were fixed in the founding era and were 
simply part of the context.  In fact, these assumptions and rules were deeply 
contested at the time and individual actors had to decide which assumptions 
and rules were applicable to the text.  Rational and just construction was the 
process of choosing which of these assumptions and rules ought to be 
employed when making sense of the Constitution.  Apart from a few trivial 
constitutional questions, there was no constitutional meaning without a 
process of construction.  Solum and other originalists have foisted their own 
ahistorical interpretive framework on founding-era texts and the results have 
been a systematic distortion of the meaning of those texts; in some instances 
the process of distortion has produced an inversion of reality in which 
originalist interpretation yields conclusions almost diametrically opposite of 
what the historical reality reveals.142 
Rather than turn to Paul Grice, a philosopher whose insights have been 
challenged by sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists who study how 
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language functions in complex literate societies,143 a better alternative would 
be to adopt a pragmatic-inferentialist model of legal meaning, not the Gricean 
semantic-pragmatic one originalists have adopted.144  An inferentialist model 
seems far closer to Madison’s theory of just construction than the model of 
fixation and constraint, or interpretation and construction, favored by many 
modern originalists.145 
If early American constitutional debate resembled an academic discussion 
around a seminar table, perhaps originalist assumptions might be apt, but the 
history of early American constitutional politics shares few features with 
discussions around conference tables or polite exchanges in a faculty lounge.  
If one looks closely at Madison’s evolving constitutional theory in the period 
between the adoption of the Constitution and the end of his presidency, one 
would be hard-pressed to claim Madison’s views or actions were shaped by 
any of the ideas that define modern originalism.  Madison believed that 
political actors outside of the courts would play a major role in shaping 
constitutional development.146 
CONCLUSION 
History has always been relevant to American law.  Getting that history 
right is important if originalism is to become a more serious scholarly 
enterprise and move beyond an ideological practice.147  Ironically, modern 
originalist theories and interpretive methods are far closer to the anti-
Federalist losers than the Federalist winners.  In this sense, originalism 
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produces a constitutional paradox:  applying modern originalist approaches 
yields a Constitution that could never have existed in the founding era 
because it would have implemented the anti-Federalist vision of the 
document.148  Rather than continue to approach the American Constitution 
as if it were written by the anti-Federalist losers, it makes far more sense to 
start with the historical fact that it was the Federalist winners who actually 
wrote the Constitution, shaped the amendment process, and dominated 
politics in the first two decades after ratification.  Anti-Federalist reservations 
and criticism played an important role in shaping Federalist responses during 
this time, and these concerns continue to echo in American public discourse 
today.  There may well be some useful lessons and cautionary warnings to 
be gleaned from a close study of anti-Federalism, but it is important to 
distinguish between history’s winners and losers.149  Modern originalists 
would do well to acknowledge this fact in the next iteration of their theory. 
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